CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gheorghe Chirila (Romania)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 570th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honour for me to assume on behalf of Romania the presidency of the Conference for the month of August. I would like to assure you that in discharging my duties I shall be at your entire disposal and I look forward to your assistance and co-operation in this very busy month of August. I look forward also to having the invaluable help of the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, of the Under-Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, and of the secretariat in general.

I would like to begin this meeting by reading to you a message addressed to the Conference by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, His Excellency Mr. Adrian Nastase, on the occasion of Romania's assumption of the presidency for the month of August. The message reads as follows:

"Romania has the honour of assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August. It is above all a period for taking stock of the work done during this year's session which will be the subject of the Conference's report to the United Nations General Assembly.

The year 1990 has seen developments of fundamental significance for the international climate, in Europe and throughout the world. We have entered a new, revolutionary phase in relations between States and nations.

For its part, Romania after the elimination of the dictatorship in December 1989, is pursuing, in the spirit of the principles for which the electorate opted in the free and democratic elections of 20 May 1990, a process of renaissance and renewal that is not without difficulty. Romania's fundamental options are democracy and pluralism, respect and full protection for the rights and freedoms inherent in the human person, elimination of super-centralized economic structures and transition to a market economy, and, externally, a broad opening to the whole world in order to link ourselves to the major processes and trends now prevailing internationally.

Present-day Romania is determined to contribute to, and become integrated in the future European structure underpinned by the strengthening, development and implementation of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act in a vision making it possible to rise above the bloc concept, pursue the process of disarmament with the participation of all States, ensure full transparency in the military field and develop and transform the CSCE into a system of peace, security and co-operation in Europe in close harmony with the global system for peace-keeping and international security.

The very essence of our foreign policy is the general development of relations with all the world's States on the basis of the principles of morality and international law and contribution to, and active involvement in international activities of immediate and longer-term interest.

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We shall give a special place to Romania's participation in the activities of the United Nations and other international organizations and bodies. In this context, a leading position belongs to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

Disarmament is still one of the great challenges facing mankind, an important, essential component of any stable system of international security.

In all the various forums and international structures for the consideration and negotiation of disarmament and arms reductions, the place and responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament are unanimously recognized. It is for this reason that we are following with interest and supporting the efforts to improve the activities and enhance the efficiency of the Conference in Geneva so that it can fully meet the legitimate expectations of the international community in keeping with the mandate entrusted to this negotiating body with a universal vocation. This is particularly so in the present situation, where rapid and positive transformations and developments under way in Europe, and in other parts of the world too, need to be reflected as fully and as soon as possible in the work and, above all, the results of the Conference on Disarmament.

The important re-thinking of strategic and military concepts and doctrines that is now under way, the dialogue between the United States and the USSR in the field of disarmament, the results to date and the prospects for the sustained pursuit of this process, the justified hopes regarding the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe, the multiplication and diversification of the measures aimed at increasing confidence and security, the efforts to reduce tension in various parts of the world and to eliminate hot-beds of conflict, the ever more frequent and ever more successful recourse to the machinery of the United Nations, including the prerogatives of the Secretary-General, are all factors which mark the present international climate, a climate more favourable than ever now for international action in the field of disarmament, for the activities of the Conference on Disarmament.

There is unanimous recognition of the efforts made in your Conference to negotiate a universal convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Along with the pursuit of, and involvement in the negotiating process, Romania has this year - as have other countries too - made significant gestures, in particular as regards confidence-building and measures to encourage at the political level the completion of the convention. Thus, as we stated in the plenary of the Conference, Romania does not produce and does not have chemical weapons and does not intend to produce or acquire such weapons in the future. Likewise, Romania is prepared to become an original party to a convention with universal participation on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Inspired by the will to contribute to progress in the work on elaborating the draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the Romanian delegation recently provided, in a working paper of the Conference, full data on the production, possession or

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non-possession, use, import and export of substances produced by the civilian chemical industry which might be of relevance to the goals of the future convention. We wish to express the hope that the progress achieved in elaborating the "rolling text" of the draft convention and the moves that are still awaited from the countries involved in the negotiations will lead in the near future to the achievement of universal, comprehensive and balanced rules, including provisions on effective international control, for the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

At the same time, Romania attaches due importance to the other items on the agenda of the Conference, in particular those aimed at nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. While supporting the goal of a total nuclear test ban, Romania accepts the principle of achieving this goal step by step. It welcomes any agreement on the limitation of underground tests and is ready to support any new moves in that direction. It is with particular pleasure that we noted the Conference's recent decision on the creation of an Ad hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban. We wish to make the most concrete contribution we can to the substantive consideration of this topic in order ultimately to attain the prohibition of all nuclear tests. It is in the same spirit that my country participates in the work of the group of experts on the detection of nuclear tests by seismic means and the international programme under way in this field.

We consider that it is important now to find the most propitious ways and means to intensify the activities and increase as far as possible the negotiating character of the Geneva Conference.

This month Romania holds both the presidency of the United Nations Security Council and that of the Conference on Disarmament. International peace and security, together with disarmament, are at one and the same time, priority and complementary objectives; their interdependence and vital importance for the nations of the world have long since gone beyond the stage of efforts at conceptual demonstration.

I would like to take this opportunity to convey to the Conference and to all the delegations participating in its work my very best wishes for success, and to express at the same time the hope that the work this year, the conclusions which you reach in your report to the United Nations General Assembly will provide the bases for increased dynamism and outstanding results for your future work, giving to it an increased stamp of negotiation in conjunction with genuine political will and full commitment, commensurate with our times and the positive developments in international life".

That ends the message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania addressed to the Conference on Disarmament.

May I now on behalf of the Conference extend my most sincere thanks to my predecessor, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, for the outstanding manner in which he conducted the work of the Conference during the month of July. I would like to express to him the appreciation of all the members of the Conference.

(The President)

His experience, his knowledge of multilateral diplomacy and his personal qualities contributed to the success of the Conference during the month which saw the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee under agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". I cannot fail to express my delegation's thanks to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan for his tireless and resourceful work, which made possible the decisive steps towards the establishment of the Committee.

The presidency for the month of August is not an easy task, since we have the heavy burden of finalizing the report to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly. The drafting of the report is an opportunity for us to take stock together of the work we have done.

This year we have managed to cover all the items on our agenda through organizational arrangements: either the creation of Ad hoc Committees or the holding of informal meetings of the Conference on item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". These meetings were useful because they enabled us to have a more structured and direct exchange of views on those subjects.

I would also like to mention the results of the informal consultations on the improvement and efficiency of the work of the Conference chaired by the Ambassador of Pakistan, His Excellency Mr. Ahmad Kamal. Although it cannot be said that each of us sees the issue of the efficiency of the Conference in the same way, our debates did show that it is necessary to try to find some better organization and more effective working methods in order to exploit the Conference's potential as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

Lastly, I would like to express the hope that the Conference continue in a positive fashion its efforts to give effect to the expansion of its membership decided on in 1983.

I note that the preparation of the report of the Conference is going well. However, some delays have already been announced in finalizing the reports of some subsidiary bodies and I would like warmly to urge the chairmen of the Committees to spare no efforts to keep to the timetable. I hope that the drafting and adoption of the final report will go as smoothly as possible.

I would like to inform the Conference that the secretariat will be distributing on Monday, 6 August, under the symbol CD/WP.388, the draft of the technical part of the annual report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly. The text of the document will be available in all the official languages in delegations' pigeon-holes.

I intend to ask the Conference to hold an informal meeting on Thursday, 9 August, immediately after the plenary meeting, to begin the first reading of the technical part of the report to the General Assembly.

Distinguished representatives, ladies and gentlemen, before moving to today's debate, I have the pleasant task of reminding the Conference that yesterday, 1 August, our host country, which so generously accords us its hospitality, celebrated its national day. I would like to ask the

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distinguished representative of Switzerland, who is participating in our work as an observer, to accept and transmit our best wishes for the happiness and prosperity of his people.

We will now turn to our work for today. In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of items 6 and 7 entitled, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of nuclear weapons" and "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who wishes to raise any question relating to the work of the Conference may do so.

On the list of speakers for today we have the representatives of France, Argentina, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Nigeria, Peru and Pakistan. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Morel.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Permit me first of all to express our satisfaction at seeing the representative of Romania, a country that is a friend of and close to France, presiding over our work. We wish your country full success in the revolution that it is accomplishing in difficult circumstances, and we know that the holding of the presidency during an important month for the Conference will give Romania the opportunity to confirm its dedication to multilateral disarmament, which is precisely what was stressed in the message from the Foreign Minister of Romania, to which we listened with great interest.

I would also like to thank your predecessors for the opening month of the summer half session, Ambassadors de Rivero and Sujka, for the excellent impetus they gave to the work of the Conference, which was marked by a number of very interesting developments.

I would also like to welcome Ambassador Ricupero of Brazil, Ambassador von Wagner of the Federal Republic of Germany and Ambassador Chadha of India and assure them of my delegation's full co-operation. Lastly, I would like to extend my wishes for success in their new duties to their predecessors, Ambassador de Azambuja, Ambassador von Stülpnagel and Ambassador Sharma, as well as to Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia and Ambassador Varga of Hungary.

At the time when the Conference is completing its work for this session, I would like to take as my point of departure the sweeping changes which have helped to alter the prospects for disarmament in order to present France's viewpoint on the questions which are of the most direct interest to us, namely nuclear disarmament in its various aspects and the other spheres of negotiation - outer space and radiological weapons, and, lastly, chemical weapons - before concluding with some thoughts on improving the functioning and efficiency of the Conference.

The scale of the changes that have occurred in less than a year in our continent has been commented on by many delegations and there is no need to revert to that. I would simply like to stress today their consequences, that

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is, the rapid transformation of the conditions in which countries situated in or involved in Europe are henceforth approaching questions of security and disarmament.

By contagion, minds have opened and the era of blocs is coming to an end once and for all. But it is not only the end of the post-war period that we are witnessing. As I emphasized recently in Vienna in the Preparatory Committee, the summit of the 35 States participating in the CSCE that will be held in Paris from 19 to 21 November next will mark still more profoundly the end of an epoch almost two centuries long in which, from the Congress of Vienna to the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, the victors and the Powers of the day shared out Europe amongst themselves around a negotiating table. For the first time, 35 States will be meeting on an equal footing freely to make heard their voices and their choices and, transcending the logic of blocs, to debate the future of a Europe that is master of its own destiny and of its relations with the world around it. Between the old order that is unravelling and the new balances that are to be created, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has, 15 years after the Helsinki Final Act, the role of becoming the institution that will manage in everyone's best interests the transitional phase that is now beginning for all the participating countries.

Does this mean that these 35 countries are only concerned with themselves and unable to turn to the world that is around them and that is also changing? The fear of such introversion exists and there has already been denunciation here and elsewhere of the risk of a transfer of tensions from the East-West axis to the North-South axis; concerned with their own affairs, bent on consolidating their immediate security and fascinated by their return to history, the European countries may allow themselves to be drawn, even involuntarily, along the road of generalized disengagement, reducing their development assistance, leaving regional or local crises to fester, resigning themselves to the weakening of international organizations. Shutting de facto the rest of the world out of the transformation of the international system would lead to a game with a nil, and even a negative score: what was gained in the North would be more than lost in the South.

It goes without saying that such an approach would run against the current history and be fraught with consequences, and no one is prepared to resign himself to it. It suffices, indeed, to look beyond Europe to see that other changes, which are also substantial, are under way. Events are giving us a sharp reminder of that this very day. There is therefore no theoretical, political or geographical limit to the profound changes through which we are now living.

Multilateral disarmament is one of the instruments that enable these various transformations to be fitted into an overall perspective. Each forum has, of course, its raison d'être, and one cannot negotiate everywhere on all the issues. But there is already de facto combination of the three negotiating forums for, first, the reduction of strategic weapons (START), and the negotiations on space in a bilateral framework, then the negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces (CFE) and the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) of 35 nations in a regional framework and, lastly, the prohibition of chemical weapons in a multilateral framework, here. These three exercises are subject to similar timetables, since a

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two-fold result must be achieved by mid-November in Vienna, the START talks must be completed by the end of the year and the chemical convention must be completed next year. Furthermore, they are linked in substance: any delays in the chemical negotiations relative to the other two would give increased military significance to the existing stockpiles and means and could jeopardize the general movement towards disarmament which is now under way in earnest. Putting the negotiations in perspective in this way highlights the special responsibility that is ours. I shall be coming back to that later in my statement.

For obvious reasons, nuclear disarmament continues to occupy a decisive place. We share the unanimous desire of States to confirm and accelerate the movement that began with the major turning point of the INF Treaty, the first treaty organizing effective nuclear disarmament.

But the change thus begun must not cause us to lose sight of a number of fundamental facts that remain. The first is the considerable disproportion between the forces of the two greatest Powers and those of a country such as France. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China remarked in this very room last February, the elimination of half of their strategic nuclear forces would still leave the United States and the Soviet Union with over 90 per cent of the world's nuclear arsenal. France therefore welcomes the prospects held out by the future START agreement and described in the Conference on Disarmament by the two negotiators of that agreement. However, it also and especially approves the two countries' undertaking to continue their talks beyond the START-I treaty, with a view to further reductions and measures aiming at strategic stability.

As the President of the French Republic recently reiterated, "... when the time comes, France will not be the last to disarm". That time will draw nearer as fast as the well-known conditions which France introduced in the United Nations in 1983 are complied with, that is, a change of nature in the gap between our strategic forces and those of the United States and the USSR, the halting of the race for defensive technologies, the elimination of conventional imbalances and the total prohibition of chemical weapons.

In addition to the quantitative disproportions, another constant fact to be borne in mind is the difference in nuclear doctrines. That of France has always been not to win a war which has broken out, but instead to prevent the outbreak of war. To quote the President of the Republic, nuclear arms can only be "arms for non-use, diplomatic weapons of balance and resistance to all blackmail, wherever it comes from. They make the very undertaking of war irrational". There is, therefore, no point in trying today to reopen a moral or ethical trial of the nuclear component of deterrence; it has to be measured by the yardstick of stability - past, present and future.

As I have often stressed in this forum, the debate on nuclear deterrence remains open and it is part of our work. Our view is that, far from calling in question this notion, progress in nuclear disarmament would tend to confirm its soundness. The efforts made by the United States and the USSR to remedy the harmful effects of the over-abundance of strategic weapons, consolidate the specific role of nuclear deterrence, that is, to make war impossible. The

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characteristic of deterrence is, indeed, to keep strategic arms at the level that is strictly necessary. When the means of deterrence become more than sufficient, they nourish the destabilizing prospect of a temptation on someone's part to wage a war with a view to winning it.

Our country, therefore, has always considered that deterrence is defensive by its very nature. It precludes all superfluity, but it implies the maintenance of forces' credibility and the exercise of technological vigilance taking into account the state of the international environment and cannot, in the present circumstances, do without nuclear experiments.

This, then, is the fundamental reason for our position of principle on the question of a nuclear test ban, a ban to which we cannot subscribe in the form now given to it, namely that of a kind of preliminary to nuclear disarmament. The halting of tests is an integral, inseparable part of the whole of nuclear disarmament.

While continuing with its experiments, France has recently reduced the annual number of its explosions from eight to six. In that regard, it is following a policy of transparency which has made it possible for several international teams of independent specialists to come and verify on the spot the harmlessness of the French tests and pursuant to which my Government is now notifying each test carried out. Thus, from 18 to 20 April last, France was host in French Polynesia to a team of 30 doctors, including 10 members of the French branch of the Association of Doctors for the Prevention of Nuclear War, an organization which received a Nobel Peace Prize in 1985, and the team was able to carry out its inquiry freely at the Mururoa site and to hold a press conference in Tahiti during which it concluded that the French tests had no impact either on public health or on the environment.

Here, and as it announced in July last year, my delegation did not obstruct the consensus of the Conference with respect to the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on a test ban. But, as its position of principle remains unchanged as to the priorities in nuclear disarmament, it does not see how it could join in an exercise which contradicts those priorities.

We are ready, however, to participate in the parallel technical activities that in no way prejudge the political aspects of the question. That is why we participated in the seminar organized at the beginning of the year in Oslo on regional seismic detection stations and are participating, for the second time, in the experimental exchange of seismic data which is now under way in connection with the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

As for another aspect relating to nuclear weapons, that is, negative security assurances, my delegation has made its views known in the Ad hoc Committee chaired by Ambassador Negrotto of Italy and whose report is being distributed today. It has supported the Committee's efforts to hold informal consultations, which are often preferable to public exchanges of polemical arguments. It cannot but regret that those efforts have not prompted the Ad hoc Committee to adopt a more realistic and pragmatic approach. It is, of course, comforting, intellectually, to repeat that the ball is in the camp of the nuclear Powers alone. It is easy to affirm that they could, if they so decided, disregard the differences in situation that

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exist both between themselves and between non-nuclear-weapon States and conclude what would be a legally binding agreement, but one based on a unilateral obligation. The reality, however, is far from being that simple. Here, too, even if the international situation is changing, certain principles remain immutable for all, whether nuclear-weapon States or not, and the most fundamental of them is that of the non-use of force except in cases of legitimate self-defence. No security system, not even one based on the existence of nuclear weapons, can disregard this principle, which it is incumbent on all States to respect. I trust that our future discussions on this subject will take that into account.

There is, lastly, a related area, that of nuclear non-proliferation, which, indeed, concerns disarmament, but also the development of harmonious co-operation between all the States interested in the development of civilian applications of nuclear energy.

I shall confine myself today to restating briefly the reasons which led us to respond to the invitation extended to us to be represented as observers at the Fourth NPT Review Conference in three weeks' time. We wished to show our interest in the important international discussions that will take place on the occasion of this meeting, especially with the prospect of the conference to be convened by the States parties, in 1995, to decide, 25 years after its entry into force, on the future of the Treaty itself, all the provisions of which we apply. We shall, for our part, continue to work for the achievement of the broadest possible consensus in favour of an equitable and stable non-proliferation régime based, in particular, on the indispensable balance between non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the development of civilian applications of the atom.

Leaving the field of nuclear matters, I now come to outer space. The turn taken this year by the debates in the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, chaired efficiently by Ambassador Shannon of Canada, is altogether encouraging. Of course, we, like many others, found it regrettable that in the spring a sterile procedural debate should have delayed unduly the beginning of the substantive work. We hope, however, that lessons have been drawn from that for the future. With respect to substance, we note with interest that the Ad hoc Committee continued and developed its efforts to increase mutual understanding of the positions of its members and of the various technical or strategic aspects of the question.

The Committee heard an unprecedented number of presentations by experts from delegations from all the groups in the Conference. Those contributions have brought out a number of useful pointers for the future of our work.

The first is that, on the subject of preventing an arms race in space, one has to beware of Manichaean simplifications and hasty constructions. Thus, before elaborating legal rules, for example on the prohibition or limitation of anti-satellite weapons, it is essential to undertake a precise analysis both of the possibilities offered by such weapons in a strategic context and of the various constraints that they are likely to encounter. This preliminary stage is indispensable for the establishment, when the time comes, of an effective, lasting régime.

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The second is that the quasi-monopoly of the two great Powers in this sphere and the inevitable links between anti-satellite systems and anti-missile systems mean that the consideration of this subject cannot be disconnected from the bilateral negotiations.

The third, and for us the most interesting point is that everyone better appreciates today the increased risks that result from the development of space activities and technological innovation for the security of satellites. This awareness is leading a growing number of delegations in the Committee to call for an approach based on increasing confidence and transparency, possibly combined with an international management instrument, such as the trajectography centre proposed by France. We welcome this and we hope that the Ad hoc Committee will be able to continue along this path and will manage to define better still the modalities for strengthening the space protection régime. For reasons of general, and not just military security, the day will come, sooner than is generally thought, when we shall see the appointment of "space traffic controllers" playing a comparable role to air traffic controllers in civil aviation now.

The approach aimed, not at eliminating existing weapons, but at preventing new weapons appearing is also that which inspires the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons chaired by Ambassador Varga of Hungary. With respect to radiological weapons stricto sensu, my delegation welcomes the fact that, after years of marking time, the work of Contact Group A was stepped up somewhat this year, thanks, in particular, to the efforts of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany. The discussions often revealed a new realism which made it possible to prepare compromise texts, in particular on the preamble and scope of the convention, on peaceful uses and on verification and compliance. My delegation tried to contribute to these developments. I must express regret, however, that this progress was countered, if not wiped out, by moves backward, by attempts to divert the convention from its objective and introduce elements which are alien to it. Here, too, our work can only progress in clarity: it is not by trying to impose constraints in this way on nuclear weapons that it will be possible to prevent the appearance of radiological weapons. Such abuse of procedure is bound to jeopardize the very promising prospects for agreement which emerged at this session.

With respect to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, my delegation, as is well known, does not participate in the work of Contact Group B. France considers that this subject falls within the ambit of the humanitarian law of conflicts, since it is dealt with in the Additional Protocols of 1977, to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. To entrust this subject to the Conference on Disarmament was, in our view, not only contrary to the Conference's mandate, but also doomed to failure, a failure that is patent today in view of the gap between delegations' positions. In this connection, we noted with interest the suggestion made on 10 July in plenary by the representative of the USSR, Mr. Batsanov: why not draw the lesson from this deadlock and leave to an appropriate forum the task of resuming work on this question, taking into account the work done in the Conference? Once that forum is found, we, for our part, will be prepared to contribute in the most active fashion to defining an immunity régime for nuclear facilities.

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I now come to chemical disarmament, which was once again the subject of intensive work, thanks to the very active chairmanship of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, with the assistance of his delegation, thanks to the work of the chairmen of the various Groups, Mr. Lamazière of Brazil, Mr. Shahbaz of Pakistan, Mr. Meerburg of the Netherlands and Mr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic and thanks, lastly, to the secretariat team led by Mr. Bensmail. I should like to take this opportunity to thank them all.

The efforts were untiring, with the mixture of patience and boldness without which it is not possible to draw along the inevitably complex whole that the Committee represents. The work was of high quality, delegations spoke in greater numbers, with more contributions by non-member countries, we derived still greater benefit than in the past from the contributions of the experts and we developed a precise and mutually enriching dialogue with the experts from industry.

And yet many agree today, with concern, that the negotiations seem to be hesitating before the major choices that still have to be made. Such a situation is not surprising; it is part of the difficulties inherent in the closing weeks of the session when, on each of the points dealt with during the year, a formal decision has to be taken to include the results in the "rolling text".

The difficulty is that this time the hesitation is lasting longer than usual and concerns a number of fundamental elements of the draft convention. But this, again, is no cause for surprise. Each delegation must be able to express its views, and the sooner the better. The negotiations have suffered too long from silence, dilatoriness and ambiguity. It is in the interests of all that all the cards should be placed on the table. Discussion cannot be suspended when a question has been clearly put, and that goes for all subjects, without exception. On the other hand, restarting from zero each time is impossible. In each of the important debates which have marked the development of the negotiations, and there has been no shortage of them, resolving the problems, achieving a compromise acceptable to all the parties and in keeping with the general trend of the negotiations, has meant starting from the work already accomplished - especially since the establishment of the "rolling text".

That text is, in effect, our memory, with all that that implies: continuity; a single reference framework; the structure, order and status of the texts, but still more perhaps, internal coherence between the various parts of this complex document, a coherence without which the convention would only be a collection of more or less disparate chapters.

Thus the inquiring mood which has affected the Committee in recent weeks should be neither dramatized nor underestimated. To our mind, things must be looked at, now and always, from the viewpoint of the completion of the convention, the only one which has any sense for us since the Paris Conference, which imposes on us an obligation of result. It is, indeed, becoming more and more clear that all the major questions now being asked or revived are closely interlinked and cannot, therefore, be resolved by this or that compromise or particular expedient, on a case-by-case basis. They can

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only be resolved by general intensification of the negotiations, which implies resort to political choices. Far from discouraging us, this analysis of the situation should lead us to the obvious conclusion: the negotiations must now be advanced, by a political decision, into their final phase, which will be next year's session. It is with this in mind that I would now like rapidly to go through the main points on which a decision is required.

First, nothing is more important than verification, and inspection on request determines the system as a whole; we are all agreed on that. The debate is now reduced to the essentials and it is time to accept the full consequences of our choices. We have to decide between two things. Either inspection under article IX, the keystone of the system, is triggered without any precondition, and that is certainly the obvious meaning of the very general phrase "at any time and anywhere" which requires no qualification of any kind; the inspection then proceeds according to the mandate, with recourse, as necessary, to the formula of controlled access, which enables full account to be taken of the security interests of the inspected State. At any rate the parties are assured of obtaining the results for which inspections are intended, that is the collection, first and foremost of facts. Or inspection is subject to a precondition, a priori according to a particular general criterion to be established independently of the conditions on the spot, and the inspection changes nature, even before it has begun, to become an exchange of arguments carried out either in capital cities or at the headquarters of the Organization or at the point of entry to the country inspected or around a facility perimeter - in short, negotiation carried out in difficult circumstances, and not a procedure of fact-finding.

In our view, it is clear that the latter approach can only multiply the obstacles and empty of its substance the raison d'etre of the procedure under article IX, namely the determination in all circumstances of whether or not there has been a militarily significant violation of the convention. If in certain cases it is from the outset impossible to obtain such an assurance, the whole verification system is called in question.

An in-depth debate within the Committee is therefore essential, and if possible in the two weeks that remain to us before the transmission of the groups' reports, since as things stand the decisions to be taken on the Chairman's text of article IX can only be provisional arrangements. We shall at least go away with clearer ideas about our respective positions, instead of being left with the past few days' inconclusive exchanges of views on questions of terminology which are not commensurate with the magnitude of the problem.

Similarly, the debate should continue on the question of ad hoc inspections, which are a response to practical questions stemming directly from the results of a large number of trial inspections carried out in more than 20 countries. The question is thus clearly a real one, and I do not see what we would gain by saying that the debate is unnecessary or does not suit certain people. If I may put it this way, the facts are even more obstinate than the delegations which brought up the question of ad hoc verification before the Committee.

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I would like to conclude on this topic by remarking that a certain number of questions and objections concerning provisions currently established or proposed in the "rolling text", concerning verification in its various forms, show that each country would be well advised to carry out on its own account one or even several national trial inspections, particularly an inspection on request, and even better, to report to the Committee on the matter.

Perhaps this would be a way of moving the discussion forward. Experiments, trial measures, are not, of course, the whole answer. We are aware of the political stakes inherent in any verification system and it is taking them fully into account that the whole system has been built up, with the guarantees and counterbalances that characterize it. But the way things are now, we shall, unless we base ourselves on concrete, shared experience, remain at the stage of a theoretical discussion incapable of yielding progress.

With respect to the principles and order of destruction, the incorporation of the Soviet-United States agreement in the text of the convention means that we now have for articles IV and V and their annexes a structure that is clear, precise and acceptable to the great majority of delegations. My delegation has stressed this point too often during the past five years - and for long amid general indifference - not to bid due welcome to this vital result. Group B, which has been extremely productive, has also clarified the definitions of article II and resolved the thorny issue of the guidelines for Schedule 1.

But I would like to dwell for a moment on the bilateral American-Soviet agreement. It has been recently the subject of rather excessive criticism which may lead to its misappreciation. Let us begin by recognizing that we owe to it the beginnings of a solution on a major question of the order of destruction; next let us acknowledge that this agreement, far from setting up a parallel or competing régime relative to the convention, is arranged in accordance with that instrument and aims at anticipating its effects for the two signatories; lastly, the effect of the agreement is to end the chemical-weapons production programmes of the two declared possessors. Who today is prepared to take on a comparable commitment among the producing countries, either presumed or potential, and which have so far declared nothing with respect to their real capacities? It seems to us then, in short, that we should keep a sense of proportion here. The so-called 2-per-cent question is a delicate one, it is true, but I see that the two signatories to the agreement recognize themselves that the solution they are proposing is imperfect in comparison with the convention. Since we are all seeking universality, let us try to find together, on the basis of this proposal and others the means to ensure the adherence of all countries to the convention.

The legal questions have both advanced and become more important. For the first time, we have a practical, coherent procedure for amending the convention. We should therefore draw the necessary consequences from the situation and adopt it in Appendix I. We have also made progress on the peaceful settlement of disputes by clearly leaving the choice to States and by spelling out the role of the Executive Council. Things are less well advanced as regards sanctions, and that is not surprising, since the Committee only took up this question last year; but we have, nevertheless, made very good

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progress in drawing up the guidelines to serve as a basis for the drafting of the relevant article. At the same time, the question of the relationship between the convention and the 1925 Protocol, that is, of usage, is of growing importance and must be handled with all the requisite tact. It is, to be sure, regrettable that not all delegations are of exactly the same opinion on this point. But is the case a unique one? Is it a reason for retreating into an all-or-nothing attitude? For my part, I prefer to see in it an obligation for all delegations to seek together the means of linking two legal instruments that, while they are very different, are both, for reasons peculiar to each of them, essential and that go in the same direction.

This kind of balanced approach has shown its worth on another highly controversial subject, that of assistance, for which Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina has consolidated remarkably the first bases that were laid last year. A real compromise is now possible for the purposes of finalizing article X. Let us take this opportunity which has been patiently developed from contrary approaches. It concerns an important, sensitive subject of exemplary value.

Similarly, we are convinced that a compromise is possible today with a little effort on all sides, with regard to article XI on economic and technological co-operation.

This leads me to the very useful dialogue that we had recently with representatives of industry on confidentiality and product lists. We moved beyond exchanges of views setting two contradictory approaches against each other to recognize together that between the present stage and the full implementation of the convention well planned transitions will enable the convention to be adapted, to some extent, to the realities of industry without sacrificing the prime imperative of the security of States parties.

Lastly, it should be noted that no progress has been possible during this session on institutional matters, especially for the Executive Council, which cannot be left, as some believe, to the last quarter of an hour or worse still, until after the convention. It would be too easy and perhaps fatal for the proper functioning of the future Organization. There cannot be a good convention without clearly defined institutions.

May I add at the end of the list another question that is still unresolved, that of old chemical weapons, which has been very disappointing? The first round of consultations held in the spring gave hope that it would be possible to establish directions. But since then that initial result has dwindled and the substantive treatment of this still uncertain subject will have to be postponed. But I would draw from this a more general lesson which applies both to the historic sequels of old conflicts and to certain regional situations to which some are too ready to refer in order to establish a link between chemical disarmament and nuclear disarmament. You cannot ask the convention to settle questions that are not within its purview, whether these are unsettled consequences of past wars or current regional crises.

Having thus rapidly reviewed the main topics, I come back to what I said at the outset about the general hesitation which seems to have taken hold of the Committee to try to understand the situation in which we now find

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ourselves: the negotiations are at once coming to maturity and seizing up and it is no longer possible to deal with questions on a case-by-case basis. What we have is, so to speak, a vehicle that is both advancing and going backwards, and this situation cannot last. Preparations must therefore be made to deal with the main topics together, and that can only come about through a collective political approach. It seems to us that the time has come to resort to the formula of a ministerial conference, but taking care to spell out the conditions of it very clearly, because the undertaking would be pointless unless it led to the conclusion of the negotiations.

We therefore propose that the Conference begin its next session in January 1991 by meeting at the ministerial level to examine the status of the negotiations at that time, identify the approaches needed to complete them, set a relatively short time-limit and give the corresponding instructions to delegations. The latter would then get down to work with the conclusion of a final agreement clearly in mind and would negotiate under the ministers' direct control. Then, when the time came, the ministers would return to Geneva to settle the final outstanding points requiring a decision at their level and to sign the final text of the convention.

It goes without saying that these two ministerial meetings, which would conform in all respects with the working conditions and procedures peculiar to the Conference on Disarmament, would be open to all the countries wishing to participate in the final phase of the work as non-member States. There must be no political or material limit that could be used against a country wishing to contribute to the negotiations, as was explicitly agreed on the occasion of the Paris Conference, and the experience of the past two years has shown how the Conference has been able to accept a growing number of non-member countries.

I know that it has been proposed, with a comparable concern for universality, that a meeting of this kind should be held in the context of the United Nations. But the negotiations cannot be re-opened elsewhere, and still less split into two; that would, in our view, be to ensure failure. It should also be recalled that the Conference on Disarmament is responsible for carrying these negotiations through to the end and the United Nations General Assembly does not fail to remind it of that each year. Lastly, a precise political mandate was entrusted to us by the 149 participants in the Paris Conference with a view to completion of the negotiations without delay. The time has come to draw all the consequences from this and to assume our responsibilities together.

What we have to do between now and the ministerial overture that we and other countries, in particular the German Democratic Republic, Australia and the Netherlands, are proposing is relatively simple. It is immediately to publish as many agreements as possible in Appendix I to the "rolling text" and where that is not possible, to preserve unchanged the latest results of the work that has been done in order to take them up again intensively in mid-November at what should be virtually a plenary session of the Committee. The Committee would then prepare the new version of the report that would serve as a basis for the meeting of ministers and the final phase of negotiations.

(Mr. Morel, France)

This has, I admit, been a very long review of the situation. I tried to put in from time to time something to keep up my colleagues' interest. At any rate, the review confirms, in our opinion, that the Conference must draw the consequences from the changes that have occurred and seize the opportunities open to it to develop still further its rightful role. It has the means to do so and the consultations undertaken successfully by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan on improving the functioning and efficacy of the Conference have just given us proof of that. I would simply mention a few points to which we attach importance and on most of which there is already consensus.

The restructuring of the schedule for the annual session into three parts should give our work a more active rhythm and facilitate the parallel consultations which are so necessary to any progress. At the same time, it must be recognized that the choice of seven weeks for two of the three parts is an absolute minimum and will require serious preparatory work in national capitals and then a very fast start if we want to make efficient use of the new arrangement. Maintaining the rule of consensus for any decision will provide everyone with a guarantee that their concerns will be taken into consideration, even if the search for consensus involves by definition a sense of compromise. The reduction in the number of plenary meetings will make it possible to concentrate on effective work in the subsidiary bodies and will impose a certain discipline as regards general statements. The agenda of the Conference ought to be designed in such a way as to prevent the Conference moving away, against the tide of history, from negotiation proper to become a mere deliberating body. Non-member States should be encouraged to make full use of the extensive possibilities open to them under the rules of procedure as regards their participation in the work of the Conference. The rules do, indeed, offer practical means that too many delegations have yet to exploit. Very often it is just a matter of overcoming a psychological barrier and taking better advantage of all the opportunities there are to make a more active contribution to our work. Lastly, we should continue to seek the simultaneous admission of all those who apply to attend.

I have tried to show how we can take advantage of the opportunity now open to us in order to get multilateral disarmament under way again, not artificially, but in response to the needs of our time. Perhaps it will be necessary to mobilize the resources of the Conference a little more and to set ourselves, step by step, more precise objectives. But is it possible to do otherwise, that is, to continue as if nothing had happened? We are all participants together in a great undertaking which is often difficult, sometimes disappointing and always complicated. It does, however, enable us to prepare the world of tomorrow, in which the methods of multilateral disarmament will make it possible to prevent and manage, worldwide, what are already being called "major risks". In point of fact, the chemical weapons negotiations show us that this is just what we must do as of now, and urgently.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of France, His Excellency Ambassador Morel, for the statement he has just made, for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and for his expressions of sympathy and encouragement regarding developments in my country. I assure him that his message has been understood. I believe that Ambassador Morel's statement goes beyond strictly technical concerns with regard to disarmament in the narrow sense. His Excellency placed the debate within our Conference

(The President)

in a global political and strategic context at the same time as he set out a philosophy of security and disarmament and a very pertinent synthesis of our work during this year's session. I would particularly like to draw attention to his comments concerning the negotiating of the "rolling text" of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. They are all the more significant as they come from the architect of the Paris Conference on chemical weapons. I am sure that delegations will have noted Ambassador Morel's exposition of the idea of a ministerial conference to conclude the negotiations on the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I would like to express to you my delegation's pleasure at seeing you presiding over the Conference during what is a particularly complex month, since it marks the end of a session that began with great expectations, expectations which we will now have to carry over to 1991. We are also grateful for the message from the Romanian Foreign Minister and shall study it with all the attention it deserves. I would also like to thank my colleague and friend, the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, for having given me his place on the list of speakers and allowed me to take the floor so that I may, when I have finished this statement, preside over the open-ended consultations on article X of the draft convention on chemical weapons in my capacity as a friend of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee.

It is a happy consequence of the present international situation, especially of the East-West climate, that expressions such as "change", "new atmosphere" and "new détente" are gradually losing their novelty to become the reflection of a world that has changed in the past 10 months, perhaps far more than we realize. Yes, we say that the world has changed. But, because of the sluggishness engendered in our attitudes by long years of costly and sterile confrontations, the actual change often goes no further than its mere enunciation. It is true that, in the complex world of power balances, and particularly in the area of security, change has to be measured by the yardstick of its effects. To replace the status quo with something new is always a difficult step to take. The comforting tepidity of the status quo, to put it thus, reassures some leaders and bolsters the aversion to change there always is on the part of those who are called upon to implement policies or to imagine the alternatives that a new situation requires.

If I have dared to provide this rather abstract introduction, it is because I sincerely believe that it is of value for the process of collective reflection that the new circumstances require for the handling of item 6 of our Conference's agenda, that is, "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", or, to use the short, though no less obscure title, "Negative security assurances".

We are all aware that on this topic, as on other items of its agenda, this organ is struggling in an impasse which has prevailed for many years, without any sign so far of a possibility of concrete progress in the search

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for what we have all agreed we must seek: a common formula that will adequately guarantee to those of us who do not possess nuclear weapons against their use by those who do have them. Year after year the debates have followed a well-known scenario in which, with the sole exception of one nuclear-weapon State, the remaining four have expressed their willingness to give certain guarantees contingent upon the presence, or absence, of conditions set for countries' eligibility to enjoy such assurances. We all know the versions of each of the declarations. Some are linked with existing international legal instruments, some make reference to the possibility of an attack or aggression in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State or against another State with which the State concerned has some sort of security agreement. Some are more and some are less qualified, but they are all conditional. Furthermore, some of these declarations seem to suggest permissible scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons.

The resulting picture, it must be admitted, could not be more confusing or disjointed. The epithet "absurd" could perhaps be added if account is taken of the trends that appear to be prevailing in the international climate.

This has been said many times in the past and it is not my delegation's intention to revert now to matters that should already be part of history. But what cannot be ignored is the indisputable fact that, since the nuclear-weapon States first issued their unilateral assurances, something very important has changed in the world. My delegation, in saying this, is convinced that, if there is an issue on which the positive effects of the new international atmosphere of co-operation and rationality should be felt in a tangible and uncontraversial manner in the Conference on Disarmament, it ought to be item 6 of our agenda, namely negative security assurances.

As is well known, the unilateral declarations were made in the period between 1978 and 1982. There is no need for me to describe why it is obvious that the circumstances and the international environment in which those declarations were uttered are diametrically opposed to the present climate. What resemblance is there between the world of the "new cold war" of the early 1980s and the world of a united Germany, a "pan-European security framework", a world of treaties such as the INF or START agreements or of the virtual operational dismantling of one of the military alliances in Europe or, even more, of the search for a redefinition in political terms of what were until yesterday vast structures prepared for war, to mention only a few examples?

Only a few days ago, the Heads of State or Government who took part in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 5 and 6 July issued the London Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance. In the Declaration a number of important considerations are presented, starting with the affirmation in paragraph 1 that the Atlantic Alliance will adapt to the new realities. Other points of similar or even greater relevance emerged from the London meeting, such as the possibility of the adaptation of concepts like "forward defence" or even - far more significantly, from the standpoint of our body - the idea of considering nuclear weapons truly "weapons of last resort". The USSR, for its part, has welcomed these announcements through an official communiqué from its Foreign Ministry.

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In view of all this, we find it really surprising that we should be told that, as regards non-nuclear-weapon States, the instructions of the past are to remain unchanged, that today, when hands are reaching out towards yesterday's enemies, and even though each side still possesses enough nuclear warheads to wipe all trace of life from the Earth many times over, those of us who do not possess nuclear weapons cannot have our security reinforced through an acceptable agreement on unqualified negative security assurances.

This is not to imply that the assurances must be provided here and now. We are ready to analyse the details and the forms they could take. After all, that is why we have an Ad hoc Committee under the patient and constructive guidance of our distinguished friend, the Ambassador of Italy. What seems impossible to understand is that nothing should be changing for the Conference on Disarmament in this field when the events at which we have barely hinted in this intervention are taking place.

The world is changing at a pace that demands of us daily efforts to adjust frames of mind and once useful interpretations of reality that are simply no good any more. In the meantime, the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances seems inescapably doomed to repeating that, beyond an agreement to seek a common formula, there is little that 40 nations have to offer the international community. We refuse to perpetuate such inaction.

These comments are intended merely as an attempt to look at an old, familiar problem with eyes that have read the London Declaration or the proposals of the Warsaw Pact, eyes convinced of the fact that security, the new security, is only conceivable on a global scale.

Before concluding, I would like to refer briefly to item 4 of our agenda, namely the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons. The final stage of the negotiation of the convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons requires from us all a series of additional efforts to continue fostering the balance and coherence of the draft convention and to accelerate the negotiating process. At the same time, we are of the view that all the States committed, like mine, to the successful conclusion of the negotiations, must focus with particular emphasis on the practical aspects of the convention, and on the attributes of those future mechanisms, in order to ensure its effectiveness.

In that context, and with the intention of keeping properly abreast of the negotiations at this crucial stage and laying the foundations for the operation of the convention in our country, the President of Argentina has recently set up, by Decree No. 1252, the Commission for the Study of the draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The fact that the Commission has been created by a decision of the executive branch rather than through recourse to lower-level administrative procedures is clear proof of the interest and expectations there are in the highest organs of my Government with regard to the successful conclusion of these multilateral negotiations and the immediate entry into force, with the widest possible membership, of the resulting instrument.

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The Commission's functions include the analysis of the various issues involved in implementing the convention. Among its purposes is, therefore, the making of a nation-wide inventory of the points relevant to the draft convention in order to evaluate them and to formulate the necessary recommendations.

Finally, I would like to stress that the Commission will be the necessary bridge towards the establishment of the National Authority to be set up in conformity with article VII of the draft convention. This will ensure the dissemination of knowledge of the provisions of the draft among the sectors concerned and facilitate the elaboration of the legal and administrative procedures necessary for the effective implementation of the convention as soon as it comes into force.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Argentina, His Excellency Ambassador García Moritán, for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair. I particularly thank him for his words concerning the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania. I am sure that delegations will have understood the subtle nuances of his brief but meaningful statement.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ambassador Králik.

Mr. KRALIK (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) (translated from French): Mr. President, permit me to wish you good luck and good health in the discharge of the office you have just assumed. I am certain that your youth will contribute to the success of our meetings as much as the experience of your predecessors brought the Conference to the present stage of consensus and mutual understanding.

This is the first time for me to take the floor in this forum. It is true that Ambassador Kamal, in bidding me welcome, honoured me with the appellation "un vieux de la vieille de Genève" or, in English, "an old hand in Geneva". But a 20-year interval is too long for a diplomat, however sharp he may once have been, not to have need of experienced mentors and friends. I have found them in the persons of Ambassadors Morel, Ledogar and Shannon and of a friend, Sergei Batsanov, who have helped me to find my way around and get through my teething troubles in this disarming family. My thanks and compliments are due to the representatives of the countries of our neighbours, to Ambassador Sujka, Ambassador Varga, Ambassador Dietze and Ambassador von Wagner.

I was born and grew up as a European and that is why I have accepted with gratitude the wise counsel of the representatives of ancient cultures geographically remote from me, the wise counsel of Ambassador Donowaki, Ambassador Hou and Ambassador Chadha, and of Ambassador Elaraby, my neighbour, and Ambassador Bosch, the spokesmen of countries that are currently striving to remedy the same difficulties that recently confronted the nations comprising the present State entities within the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

(Mr. Králik, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic)

Last, but not least, permit me also to thank two members of our family who by language and temperament are very close to me, the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and Ambassador Kosin.

(continued in English)

It was Napoleon who claimed that "geography determines the fate of every nation". My country lies in the heart of Central Europe, so it is no wonder that its geographical location has for 2,000 years brought us grief as well as joy. From Roman times, important trade routes crossed in Central Europe, which broadened the horizons of the nations which make up our country through culture and brought economic progress from other countries and nations. But many bloodthirsty raids and destructive wars were also waged across our land. Yet, in addition to death, even these brought something positive. They taught us to cherish peace and co-operation on an equal basis among States. So it is these attributes of multilateral diplomacy whose inevitability has been proclaimed by Czechoslovak delegations within these premises of the League of Nations with the same vigour as I would like to emphasize at this forum in the name of my delegation.

The Czechoslovak delegation is in full accord with the opinion stated at this forum on several occasions that, together with Europe itself, this disarmament Conference too is living through a time of renaissance. One of the phenomena of every renaissance is the effort to renew that which formed the integrity of classical culture, ending that which supported the pagan and barbarian practices of "divide and rule". Therefore in this forum too we must see to it that the invented doctrine of "balance of fear", which drove Europe into the cold war and drove my country into intellectual and material isolation, is replaced by an effort to create a new social and legal space imbued with the ideals of human rights and to build mutual trust. The most recent experiences in Europe prove at the same time that this kind of space can emerge even if there are no "blocs", in harmony with the ideal of institutionalizing international relations and in an atmosphere of co-operation among States, but never in an atmosphere of suspicion and confrontation.

The thousand-year-old heritage of our European civilization is being enriched at the present time with new knowledge. Neither by "Europe in us" nor by "we in Europe" will we be able to exist alone in a world joined together by satellites, without widely developed friendly relationships with those nations and States which fate has decreed should live on other continents. Nevertheless, I would like to assure this international forum that as far as our relations with other States are concerned, one single criterion applies for us. It is what our "tutor of nations", Jan Amos Comenius, passed on to us: "... the wisdom and valour of nations is not expressed by the power of weapons, but by the power and strength of the entirety of useful knowledge".

Allow me to put forward, from the standpoint of this criterion, our position on those questions which deserve the closest attention and greatest effort on the part of all regions represented at this Conference. These are in particular items 1, 4 and 5. I wholeheartedly concur with the opinion of

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several other delegations that in order to make substantial progress this Conference must concentrate its efforts on a smaller number of agenda items. I highly value the consensus of all the participants in this room for a renewal of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Our delegation is particularly pleased by this because the Committee began its work on the basis of the draft mandate proposed by Czechoslovakia in 1988. We look forward to seeing this Committee, in keeping with its mandate, contribute towards achieving that long-anticipated goal - a general and total ban on nuclear weapons testing. In this context, we want to express our conviction that the global ban on nuclear testing is the most effective measure on the path to the total elimination of that "inheritance of Satan", humankind's immense nuclear arsenal. And not just that. This ban also represents a stable barrier against the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. We believe that the work of this Committee is directed toward determining concrete aspects of the nuclear test ban. In this respect, the amendment conference to the PTBT, to be held in New York next January, will certainly make a contribution. The broadening of the scope of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 to include underground explosions too closes the logical circle of nuclear testing. In this connection, we want to express our support for the view that it would be very appropriate to limit the possibilities for simply exchanging military explosions for detonations for peaceful purposes by making this ban also cover the latter.

All aspects of nuclear testing, as well as nuclear disarmament in general, will take on much greater dimensions also in view of the forthcoming Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This Treaty is an indivisible part of the support mechanism for international security. We therefore are against any kind of weakening of the spirit and letter of the Treaty, or its depreciation. On the contrary, we are prepared to share in helping to make it as effective as possible. We are fully aware that proliferation of the nuclear weapons arsenal, especially in regions of crisis, would mean a serious danger for world peace and strategic stability. As in other areas of priority in the disarmament process, we need mutual trust, effective verification and understanding. We also need this because the general easing of the international atmosphere, anticipated by the successful conclusion of the Soviet-American START talks and the conference on conventional armed forces in Europe, are a springboard for reinforcing changes in the strategic security concept of military-political blocs. In this connection, we can in the future look forward to an impulse also in the field of negative security assurances. There is, it is true, a certain "Yes, but ..." to think about. Let's consider a parallel. The saying goes in circles concerned with international law that multilateral diplomacy is undeniably able to "lead a herd of elephants to the river, but it can't make them drink". Like other figures of speech, however, not even this one - regardless of its truth - is absolutely valid. You can, it is true, lead only thirsty elephants to the river - or else (and this is the better solution) you can make even water so attractive for everybody that they all begin to imbibe it voluntarily. So let us all make an effort together to look for those attractive elements which will accommodate all the delegations, assuming reasonable compromises.

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For quite a long while we have been simply marking time in the question of preventing the arms race in outer space. We have a high regard for the work of those experts who have provided the Committee with such a great amount of information, of intricate calculations, and photographs from all kinds of satellites. Certainly all this is very instructive for many, but the real results of the Committee are more or less symbolic.

Nevertheless, we believe that the Committee should keep its finger on the pulse of all space activities as they develop. This is not just for technical reasons, but from the political and negotiating standpoints. The need for a realistic assessment and solution of the real problems which exist should preoccupy not only the big space Powers. Preventing the militarization of space and transforming it for wide peaceful purposes are very general concepts. So far, conditions have not been created which would allow a complex discussion of these questions. However, we can direct ourselves toward more modest goals. One of these would be to work out a round of measures for building mutual confidence. There has been a lot of talk about this, but not very much has been done so far. Let us try to direct the efforts of our experts in this direction.

A second area could be working out a kind of data base on the launching of satellites and the collection and classification of technical data. For this purpose, it would be a good idea to establish a scientific centre whose work could be shared among scientists in different parts of the world. The more information and the more experiences and the more opportunity for comparisons, the more could be built to contribute to deeper and more widespread co-operation, putting into practice the idea that space is a value common to all humankind. At the same time, let us not forget what Aristotle said: "Everything that has already happened, can happen again". This planet could certainly not survive a chain of Chernobyls in space.

The field in which most attention is focused and in which we have made most progress, although the ongoing talks might not indicate this, is the outlawing of chemical weapons. One of the most discussed questions is the problem of control.

Systematic verification under the chemical weapons convention will only cover facilities which have been declared by the State parties. However, prohibited activities might occur at facilities which have not been declared or were declared, but not as subject to international monitoring. To assure full compliance with the projected convention, additional verification methods are discussed. In case of serious suspicion or allegation of a breach of the chemical weapons convention, challenge inspection might be applied. In principle, challenge inspection can be applied to both military and civilian facilities. To learn the practical problems of this type of inspection, many States participating in the Conference on Disarmament have made trial challenge inspections at both civilian and military facilities. Challenge inspection has both political and technical aspects. Czechoslovakia believes that challenge principles on the base of its obligatory character, without right of refusal, any time, anywhere and at short notice, are in agreement with its previous statements. The technical aspects of challenge might be solved on a practical level by evaluation of real experiences from national

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experimental challenge inspections. Czechoslovakia agrees with the proposal of the United Kingdom to conduct national challenge inspections by a number of countries participating in the Conference on Disarmament, as was suggested in United Kingdom documents CD/921 and CD/1012.

This challenge inspection - now inspection on request - was conducted in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic at the beginning of July. I am now submitting to this disarmament Conference two documents, CD/1021 and CD/1022. One of these is concerned with the inspection of a military facility and the second is concerned with the inspection of a civilian chemical plant. Our experiences, which are summarized in the conclusions of both documents, could be of some importance for further negotiations in this field. However, a very important conclusion - and that is why I am reiterating our support for having as many States as possible conduct their own trial inspections - stems directly from this for every State and that is that this will point out the many questions or difficulties which will have to be solved by its joining the convention. It will show what technical, legal, personnel, military and other problems will arise for a given State when the convention enters into force.

Let me, in addition, express my personal opinion on this question: Talleyrand has already pointed out that "war is much too serious a thing to be left only to military men". Therefore it is very good that all these technical questions which have been discussed in the framework of the convention on chemical weapons are being verified in practice, at least partially, by so many experts. It is not just a challenge inspection, but there are also, for instance, a whole range of national trial inspections which have been carried out by many countries which have taken part in the Conference on Disarmament in past years. There is also the Finnish initiative about an inter-laboratory round-robin test, along with many other programme These practical experiences open the way to compromise solutions within the text of the future convention.

I believe that this Conference is taking place at the right place, at the right time and with the right people. The place is not changing, the people are coming and going, but time is running out. It would be a pity for humankind if this right time were lost.

In conclusion, may I quote a witty Irishman who did not know about the disarmament Conference, but who defined its orientation very accurately: "When we look backwards, we tip our hats and when we look forward, we roll up our sleeves".

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ambassador Králik, for his statement and his kind and encouraging words concerning the Chair. I see in what was said by Ambassador Králik in French a further sign of his friendship for the French-speakers in the Conference: (continued in English) welcome to the French-speakers' club of Geneva, Your Excellency.

(continued in French)

I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, at the outset, let me, on behalf of the Nigerian delegation, offer you my warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August. We are grateful to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, for the very able manner in which he discharged his onerous assignment during the month of July. May I also seize this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues, Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Rubens Ricupero of Brazil, Ambassador Chadha of India and Ambassador Juraj Králik of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

As we enter the last month of the current session, it is pertinent to make some observations on developments on the international scene, especially those that are relevant to the Conference on Disarmament. The year 1990 began with an improved international atmosphere reflecting the relaxation of tensions and the increase of confidence among States. Confrontation and years-long military conflicts are gradually giving way to political dialogue. The successful outcome of the Washington summit last May represents an important step in the reduction of huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons by the super-Powers. That so much could be achieved so quickly, after leaving behind the "cold war", shows that disarmament becomes possible only after improved political relations make excessive dependence on these weapons less necessary.

My delegation welcomes the declared intention of the leaders of the two great countries to break with the past, which was characterized by fear, suspicion and mistrust. It now seems clear that the considerable measure of substantive agreement is beginning to have positive effects on a number of areas of bilateral arms limitation, and further progress will, I hope, continue to be definitive and not reversible.

While acknowledging the importance of these bilateral developments, my delegation believes that disarmament is an issue of concern to all States. Bilateral efforts should therefore complement the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum. We must ensure that the intrinsic qualities of this body are fully utilized for the purpose of securing global disarmament measures. By proclaiming the Third Disarmament Decade last May in New York, the United Nations Disarmament Commission underlined the need for the international community to seek early reduction of nuclear weapons and work towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Nuclear items which have been accorded the highest priority in our agenda have received very little attention in our work. We welcome the recent re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban after almost seven years. We are grateful to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan for his tireless efforts in ensuring that the Ad hoc Committee was established. We are also grateful to his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, whose perseverance and diplomatic skills are noteworthy. We share the view expressed last Tuesday by Ambassador Nabil Elaraby of Egypt in his statement that the Committee "should also agree on a programme of work that would take into consideration the necessary elements of elaborating a framework, structure and scope of a draft treaty which should include, by definition, acceptable and verifiable means of verification and compliance". Indeed, the international community expects to see negotiations leading to a very rapid process of elimination of nuclear

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weapons. It is therefore with profound consternation that my delegation continues to hear of the supposed continuing validity of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and the intention of some nuclear-weapon States to retain nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

We are familiar with the arguments against a comprehensive test ban. My delegation appreciates the emotional and political fear and fixations about inspection and verification arrangements. But if the risk is that of daring the good faith of one another and not of mutual annihilation, it should be taken before it is too late. If the risk is not to diminish their current military capabilities, but to avoid the spread of nuclear weapons, it should be taken now. If the risk is not to challenge their present leadership roles in the world, but to enhance the performance of the primary responsibility assigned to them through the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, that risk should be taken now to ban all nuclear tests.

My delegation is encouraged to press this point because both super-Powers have hitherto always respected the agreements they have reached. We opened this session amidst further relaxation of East-West tensions and the prospects of reversing the decades of nuclear armament. As East-West tension appears to have subsided, the time is ripe for the nuclear-weapon States to extend the new spirit of co-operation to a comprehensive test ban.

My delegation is aware of the complexities of the issues involved in the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. This notwithstanding, we are greatly worried that the CD has very little to report - and this has become the rule rather than the exception - except a catalogue of discussion and more discussion - although we all recognize that a CTB is an indispensable step on the road to positive nuclear disarmament.

In three weeks' time, the Fourth Review Conference of Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a major international political event, will commence in Geneva. My delegation has always felt that the NPT, far from being an end in itself, is an important disarmament measure for all States aimed at the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Twenty years after the NPT entered into force, we note with satisfaction that more than 140 States are now parties, and we hope others will soon find themselves able to accede to the Treaty. Admittedly, two nuclear-weapon States and some threshold States without safeguard facilities are yet to be signatories, hence the lack of universality.

Let me reiterate again that the Treaty imposes rights as well as obligations on nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. It is, however, becoming increasingly disturbing that, once non-nuclear-weapon States have assumed their obligations, they have been denied the economic and scientific benefits. Co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology is one area yet to be fulfilled. The activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has a vital role to play in disseminating the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear technology, is replete with the yawning gap between the expenditure on safeguards and the expenditure on technical co-operation. The nuclear-weapon States should understand that unless a satisfactory balance

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is struck in the provisions for the IAEA to carry out its two-part mandate arising from its Statute as well as the NPT, a certain tension will continue to mark the work of the Agency. Thus, urgent steps should be taken to overhaul the present level of inadequate assistance to the non-nuclear-weapon States in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

The painstaking preliminary work already done by the three Preparatory Committee meetings is an indication of the seriousness with which the Review Conference is being taken. There has been a sense of expectation arising from recent events and statements by those who are expected to give meaningful contribution towards general and complete disarmament. My delegation believes that neither the anticipation nor the expectations aroused by these encouraging statements are enough to make us feel secure or even over-optimistic. The stake is too high for complacency.

As we move towards the Fourth Review Conference, several refrains will again be heard about putting the NPT on track. These will include appeals for universal adherence; reduction of vertical proliferation and prevention of other forms of nuclear proliferation; enhancement of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology; and establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones as barriers against further proliferation. As useful as these measures could be, the success of genuine and lasting non-proliferation rests on a comprehensive test ban.

Mr. President, let me now turn to the ongoing negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on chemical weapons. My delegation notes with satisfaction the tremendous resources and efforts of the Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, in ensuring continued progress. I believe that the outstanding issues in the convention can be resolved if a sense of urgency is injected into the negotiations.

This brings me to our concern for chemical weapons, which must go far beyond the periodic expressions of abhorrence about their use. After all, those who have been accused of using these weapons are not solely or even necessarily the producers. Naturally, humanitarian concern about the effect of this category of weapons of mass destruction is well and good; however, we should go beyond that and tackle the issue from the source and the maintenance of international peace and security must not rest solely on the presumption of the highest standard of behaviour by some States. If the use of chemical weapons is reprehensible, so should be their development, production, stockpiling and transfer. International emotion should not only be whipped up when there is suspected use of chemical weapons. There must be a sustained international effort to eliminate these weapons from the arsenals of those who possess them.

We have come to a crucial stage in the consideration of this agenda item. Ambassador Hyltenius's consultations on a number of issues, especially on challenge inspection, have not only helped to illuminate the very complex and sensitive nature of the issues, but are also helping the Committee to find its way, as it were, through the maze. The Chairman's proposal on challenge inspection, now christened inspection on request, has received considerable attention. Specific issues like the mandate, the role of observers, the

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powers of the Director-General, alternative measures, managed access and the report deserve mention. I will however direct my comments to two of these issues, namely, the observers and managed access.

My delegation agrees with the prevailing view that an observer should be present during an inspection. It is only his presence that can reassure the requesting State, without necessarily calling into question the impartiality and integrity of the inspection team. My delegation also endorses the view that his role is to observe the conduct of the inspection, although the extent of access he can be granted is not yet clearly defined. An observer who is not granted sufficient access will have good grounds not only to complain of, but also to reject the outcome of an inspection exercise, especially if the report indicates that no violation has taken place. An observer so affected will particularly feel aggrieved if the inspected State party denies him access. My delegation would prefer that any decision to refuse access to an observer should be left to the inspection team.

The proponents of managed access have always felt that challenge inspection, or inspection on request, should be conducted with some degree of flexibility, some leeway, for an inspection exercise could otherwise be dead-locked. It is hoped that, with managed access, the inspection team would have the access needed for effective verification, while the inspected State party would also have the protection of its national security it requires. This places a very weighty responsibility on the inspection team, which may invariably have to arrange the managed access in conjunction with the inspected State party. However, there could be a source of friction between States parties and inspection teams; to forestall such a development, there is the need to elaborate general guidelines on managed access.

Significant progress has been recorded in the elaboration of settlement of disputes and amendments. The issue of sanctions, now referred to as "measures to redress a situation", is of great interest to my delegation. Firstly, there is a need to ensure that the various organs of the Organization that will be involved in these measures are given the scope to perform their duties. In particular, the Conference of the States Parties, the highest organ of the future Organization, should be able to make recommendations when reporting to the Security Council any case of grave threat to international peace and security arising from a serious violation of the convention. My delegation does not share the view that such recommendations amount to an encroachment on the powers and prerogative of the Security Council.

Secondly, the convention needs to be fortified with provisions that will permit the adoption of swift and effective measures against any contravention of the convention and threats to States parties. My delegation therefore welcomes the provision for the Conference of the States Parties to recommend collective measures to States parties against possible violations. A provision such as this will reassure States parties of their security, attract more adherents to the convention, and enhance its universality, another area of interest to my delegation.

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Considerable attention has been given to the issue of universality of the convention. In this regard, it has been stressed that the convention must above all be non-discriminatory. My delegation agrees entirely with this view. We note with satisfaction the recent United States-Soviet bilateral Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons. The Agreement, however, does not provide for total and unconditional destruction of their chemical weapons stocks, nor the extensive verification provisions required for a global chemical weapons convention. Only complete and unconditional destruction of all stockpiles as provided for in the draft convention can ensure the universal and effective prohibition of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Nigeria, His Excellency Ambassador Azikiwe, for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair. We all remember with what distinction and skill Ambassador Azikiwe conducted our proceedings in March this year. I am sure delegations have taken note of the concerns and ideas expressed by the distinguished representative of Nigeria.

I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Minister Counsellor Calderón.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I am very gratified to have the floor today when you, as the representative of Romania, are assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. To your experience and skill in conducting our proceedings, I should like to add my delegation's pledge to support you as far as possible. My delegation also greatly appreciates the message addressed to the Conference by your country's Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I should also like to take this opportunity to convey my sincere thanks to Ambassador Bogumil Sujka for his wise leadership throughout the month of July, of which the significant results that we achieved are a tangible expression.

I should also like to pay tribute to Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki and his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, who, by their experience and persistence, made possible the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee to deal with the topic of a nuclear test ban. We hope that, as from 1991, that Committee will be able to embark on substantive discussions concerning the structure and scope of a convention that will ban nuclear testing in all environments. To have achieved such a result after six years of untiring efforts is undoubtedly a first step in the right direction. We are convinced that rather than being the product of a specific set of circumstances, the important achievement on item 1 of our agenda is a genuine reflection of our resolve to avoid any further postponement of substantive work of the negotiation of a definitive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In this connection, my delegation hopes for a successful outcome to the work of the Group of Scientific Experts which is now meeting.

It is proper that we recall every now and then, as we frequently do, that this is the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, but we must not forget either that negotiation for the sake of negotiation is not an end in

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itself. What is required is that the great amount of good will, time and resources that we invest each year should from time to time produce concrete and positive results.

That is why I would like to refer to the work that has been going on in the context of the informal consultations led by Ambassador Kamal, since the delegation of Peru considers it particularly important to be able to try to achieve consensus on the very necessary and long overdue improvement of the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament in order to make its work effective and more timely. It is in this context that I would like to mention some of the topics that are covered by the informal consultations.

First of all, I think it imperative to resolve in a positive fashion the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. We cannot conceal behind a specious procedural debate a certain lack of political will to arrive at the required increase of the number of members of the Conference. There might be, however, an interpretation according to which the "1 + 1 + 2" formula does not necessarily correspond any more to the political realities now that we are witnessing the dissolution of rigid ideological and political blocs and the world order is being redrawn in the light of new parameters affecting the North-South relationship.

For this reason, new formulas for sharing out the seats must be taken into account, even if it is assumed that in the near future some reduction may occur in the present number of members. Why, then, not consider new alternatives for an integral solution such as a 1 + 3 pattern? Further, it might be argued that a partial solution would not be the most appropriate now since, rather than helping to break the deadlock, it might generate imbalance and exacerbate the current lack of decision.

During the consultations we have supported the reorganization of the sessions so that as from next year we have three sessions of 10, 7 and 7 weeks respectively. We note with satisfaction that this new distribution would win the support of all delegations; that will make it possible, among other things, to have more pauses for the inevitable consultations and co-ordination with our respective capitals. Provided, that is, we make proposals for amendments to avoid the long and sterile discussions concerning mandates and programmes of work.

It is a good idea to leave open the possibility of having some type of activity in the inter-sessional period with a view to defining the consensus about mandates or programmes of work, but we must not lose sight of the fact that it is one thing to examine the improvement of the mandate of a pre-existing subsidiary organ and something very different to reach agreement on the mandate of a subsidiary organ that is about to be established. In the latter case, the inter-sessional work will be of the greatest importance and care must be taken to ensure that the consultations involve all the States members of the Conference.

However, concerning the first case, that is, the refinement of the mandate or the agreeing of the programme of work of an existing subsidiary organ, my delegation would like to restate the point of view it expressed at the inaugural meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on item 1 to the effect that, in

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addition to the inter-sessional work entrusted to the President of the CD, on some specific topics the chairmen of the relevant subsidiary organs might pursue their consultations in order eventually to be able to hand over to their successors a more fluid situation that would facilitate the next year's negotiations. A specific example might well be agenda item 1, on which Ambassador Donowaki could continue holding consultations during the inter-sessional period in order to have a suitable programme of work next year.

While it is certain that for the time being the rule of consensus in the CD cannot be changed, opposition to consensus on procedural matters should not be obstructionist, but positive in nature, so that no State member of the Conference can be in a position to veto or oppose the general feeling. On this matter, I think it is appropriate to emphasize the constructive attitude of some countries members of this forum, those which, despite not being in agreement with the course of the negotiations on certain topics, are not objecting to the existing consensus even though they may decide to remain outside the negotiating process for a while. We must require a similar constructive attitude from those who individually are not in harmony with the general and majority trend in the Conference.

Another question of the utmost importance for this Conference is the agenda. As I said earlier, some of the topics that appear on the agenda are directly related to the concept of blocs, which is now being superseded. For this reason, it is desirable that the agenda of the Conference should be brought into line with the fluid international situation as soon as possible, lest the present escape us, as Flaubert used to say.

Many delegations have made proposals to this effect. It is not a mistake to say how paradoxical it is that, at a time when freedom is blossoming in the world, the Conference should not be adapting to the new international circumstances through which we are living and that, if we were to persist in this attitude of not adapting to the reality, we might expose the Conference to a crisis for reasons of ossification or obsolescence.

For our part, we would like to stress that in the decalogue that underpins the agenda of this Conference we find the topic of conventional disarmament. Its importance was highlighted as long ago as during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, when the need was stressed to carry out, in parallel with negotiations on nuclear disarmament, negotiations on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments within the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament and with the States that have the largest military arsenals bearing a special responsibility in this respect. The negotiations, it was said, should be carried out on the basis of the principle of undiminished security of the parties and promotion and enhancement of stability at a lower military level. Furthermore, it is widely recognized that conventional weapons consume more than 70 per cent of world spending on armaments; that means a tremendous drain in terms of human, technological and economical resources. These resources could be far better used if they were harnessed for the promotion of our countries' social and economic development.

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These are the considerations that have led Peru continuously to promote cessation of the conventional arms race. Important precedents that can be adduced in this respect as regards South America are the 1974 declaration of Ayacucho, or the conversations initiated in 1986 between the military authorities of Peru and Chile with the aims of confidence and reducing arms spending. I think it is also relevant to highlight the Peruvian initiative that was embodied in 1985 in resolution 40/94 A which introduces for the first time in the United Nations the concept of conventional disarmament on a regional scale. Finally, two recent precedents are to be found in the Galápagos Declaration signed by the five countries of the Andean Group and the declaration that has just been signed by the Presidents of Mexico and Guatemala with a view to achieving the limitation of conventional offensive weapons in Latin America.

All this leads us to conclude that in the present circumstances it would be highly appropriate for this Conference to include conventional disarmament in its agenda. My delegation feels that if we manage to establish a certain framework to guide disarmament policy at the conventional level, that framework might later be translated into concrete agreements to be applied regionally by interested countries.

I would now like to refer briefly to two proposals that my delegation is submitting to the Conference today within the context of the negotiations now under way in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. My delegation is perfectly aware that this is not the time to embark upon a substantive discussion of new proposals. However, we hope that, with the circulation of these proposals as official documents of the Conference, there could at least be some preliminary discussion, subject to preparing more thorough analysis during the inter-sessional period and in 1991.

Before introducing the proposals, I would like to emphasize that my delegation believes that the Ad hoc Committee entrusted with the task of negotiating a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons cannot continue its work indefinitely. Next year, then, it will be necessary to set a deadline for the conclusion of its work and it will also be necessary to clarify its mandate once and for all, so that the Ad hoc Committee is also in a position to negotiate the prohibition of any type of use of chemical weapons. Because of its choice of 1991 as a time-limit, my delegation can agree with what was said by the distinguished Ambassador of France, Mr. Morel, to the effect that the political work could well be intensified next year with a view to the prompt conclusion of the negotiations that are now under way.

The first proposal, contained in document CD/1024, refers to the environment and aims at the inclusion in the future convention of a new article referring to this important topic. In the opinion of my delegation, the underlying principle in humanity's obligation to protect its natural environment is that all human activity should be carried out without detriment to the ecological integrity of the environment. Whether it is an industrial activity or chemical recycling, it cannot disregard this fundamental principle unless it prefers to value immediate returns on investment over the quality of life.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

Within the context of the future convention, there are, in the opinion of my delegation, two cases in which there may be damage to the environment. The first concerns the period of destruction, which entails the handling, transport, destruction proper and disposal of thousands and thousands of tonnes of highly toxic chemical waste. At this point, no one can deny that this involves a risk, however small, of accidents and of damage to neighbouring populations and the environment. At any rate, my country's intention is to strengthen measures to provide material security and to remind people that, when we talk about chemical disarmament, what we have in mind is not only to ban a particular type of weapons of mass destruction, but also to spare humanity the risk of seeing itself involved in a massive catastrophe as a result of error or negligence in the process of destroying these weapons.

The second case in which there might be environmental damage is that of the development of the chemical industry for purposes not prohibited by the future convention. Here we assume the most optimistic scenario, namely, scrupulous compliance with the ten-year destruction period, followed by the continued expansion and development on authorized chemical industry. However peaceful a facility's activity, the risk of accident will be present: the tragedies of Seveso and Bhopal, the consequences of which are still being felt today, are dramatic proof of that. This is why the Organization to be set up cannot remain indifferent, or on the sidelines in the case of accidents arising from the peaceful development of the chemical industry.

Lastly, the proposal suggests establishing an assistance and environmental protection fund to make possible the promotion in developing countries of prevention and environmental decontamination programmes. Running this fund would be the responsibility of the Organization.

Without looking far afield, last night I found out about the environmental questions now arising in a neighbouring country because it is apparently intended to begin building a citric acid factory there. As the world's population increases, the space available on this planet decreases and the environment becomes a very valuable asset.

To conclude, a few words about the second proposal, which appears in document CD/1025. Originally introduced by Peru in the Ad hoc Committee in 1988, this proposal, for a "clause of automatic nullity" is an updated version that we place before the Committee in connection with the issue of universality, the political implications of which call for informal treatment in the light of the objectives pursued by the future convention. My delegation believes that the fundamental requirement is to ensure that the multilateral instrument to be adopted can, right from the outset, enjoy the unanimous support of the international community, which is why it must be, among other things, non-discriminatory. For this reason, we propose that if, at the end of the ten-year period for destruction, the Organization is not in a position to declare that all the States parties have carried out the obligations specified in article I, the obligations shall cease for all States parties not possessing chemical weapons.

I would like to stress that both proposals are in addition to others and could suffer the same fate with respect to the "rolling text". We have no doubt that, in the end, the outcome of the negotiating effort will be satisfactory to everyone.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Peru, Minister Counsellor Calderón, for the statement that he has just made, for his kind words to the Chair and for his comments concerning the message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of Romania addressed to the Conference. I would also like to thank him for introducing the two working papers tabled by the delegation of Peru today.

I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, let me, at the very outset, express my pleasure at seeing you preside over our deliberations during the final month of our current session. This is a crucial period and we are confident that you will be able successfully to discharge your responsibilities in the days ahead. Let me assure you that my delegation and I will extend our fullest co-operation to you during the current month, as well as during the inter-sessional period.

A number of colleagues have joined us since I last took the floor in the plenary. I would like to extend a welcome to the Ambassadors of Brazil, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ethiopia and the Federal Republic of Germany.

As we approach the end of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament I wish to address the subject of the chemical weapons convention, to which we have devoted a great amount of time and effort over the last few years and which, despite the various obstacles, continues to hold the maximum degree of promise among the various items on our agenda. The negotiations on this convention have now reached a stage where an end is in sight, but not yet quite within our grasp. The intensity of our negotiations on this subject is a reflection of the international consensus which exists on the need to ban chemical weapons, and it is our hope that this commitment on the part of the international community will be sustained till the achievement of our final goal.

Before I address some of the specific issues being discussed in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, allow me to state once again that Pakistan neither possesses chemical weapons nor desires to acquire them. Consequently, we have a deep and abiding interest in a comprehensive, effective and equitable treaty that would prohibit the development, stockpiling, acquisition and use of chemical weapons and ensure the total destruction of existing stockpiles, facilities and delivery systems of chemical weapons. At the same time, we would not favour any partial or discriminatory approach to the prohibition of chemical weapons, since this would leave the door open for the use of chemical weapons and discriminate against the developing countries which do not possess the capability to produce such weapons.

There is no doubt that the procedures for verification included in the convention will constitute its backbone and will be essential to provide the assurance that the obligations regarding the destruction of stockpiles and facilities and for the non-acquisition of chemical weapons are being complied with by all parties. It is also clear that verification will involve a combination of national and international means, and that international verification will, in certain circumstances, entail intrusive procedures to

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ensure compliance. Based on these assumptions, we have been developing a verification régime which has two key components, namely, routine inspection and challenge inspection. Even though our negotiations have not yet been concluded on these two systems of verification, and we are still not clear as to their final shape, we have witnessed a recent effort to introduce another element in the verification régime, to be now called by its authors ad hoc verification. Without repeating the arguments that one has heard in the Ad hoc Committee against the need for such a system, I would only like to point out at this juncture that this concept has also been debated in the past and its proponents have not been able to make out any convincing case for the injection of this third concept into the verification régime. We believe that the procedures presently being discussed are adequate, and that there is no need for another régime which could politicize the Technical Secretariat by giving it the right to initiate disguised challenge inspections against States parties. We hope that the proponents of this concept will accept the fact that there is, as yet, no agreement even on the need for a further detailed discussion of the concept of ad hoc verification in the Ad hoc Committee.

The procedures for challenge inspection will have a crucial place in an effective verification régime which would be required to deter violations, as well as to create confidence in compliance. There is general recognition that challenge inspections should be mandatory, with States having no right of refusal. However, as regards the actual conduct of the inspection, procedures still need to be evolved that will reconcile the demands of an effective inspection with the legitimate right of States to protect sensitive information and installations which are not related to chemical weapons. Moreover, the whole range of issues connected with follow-up to the submission of the inspection report still need to be addressed adequately. We believe that, once doubts have been raised publicly about compliance with the convention, the matter can no longer be regarded as one of concern only to the requesting and requested States, to be resolved by them bilaterally. Every party to the convention has an interest in seeing to it that the inspection is carried out in an effective manner and that a clear-cut finding is arrived at on compliance or otherwise. It is obvious that the Executive Council is the appropriate organ to make such a determination.

My delegation fully supports the initiative taken by Ambassador Hyltenius to arrive at some textual language for article IX, and we have been actively participating in the negotiations being conducted by him. Care has, of course, to be taken that the concerns of no States are marginalized.

The composition of the Executive Council continues to be a difficult question and, as we enter the final phase of our negotiations, there is an increasing need to address the matter. My delegation believes that the Executive Council should not be so large in size as to weaken its capacity to take decisions, nor should it be so small as to deprive it of a truly representative character. Its precise composition should be based on the geographical divisions recognized by the United Nations. We disagree with arguments calling for the establishment of an organizational set-up which would give a privileged position to the developed nations at the expense of developing countries. We realize the existing inequalities in today's world, but we cannot support their being institutionalized in an international agreement which draws its strength and validity from the basic objectives of comprehensiveness and globality.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

We share with most delegations the view that the Executive Council should consist of about 25 members. However, we also believe that the convention should provide for an increase in the membership of the Executive Council once the total number of States parties goes beyond a certain figure, or when States parties agree to expand its membership.

As the Executive Council would be the supreme political organ under the convention, it is imperative that it should have an effective decision-making mechanism. The consensus principle, by giving every member virtually the right of veto, would be a prescription for paralysis, especially in situations where decisions or actions are most required. On the other hand, a significant number of States may be reluctant to accept decisions by a simple majority, especially where substantive matters are concerned. There is also the additional question of determining what is substantive and what is procedural. The dilemma could be resolved by basing all decisions, procedural and substantive, on a qualified majority of States present and voting. Such a solution would not only be unambiguous, but would also have the merit of being simple and effective.

My delegation has taken a particular interest in articles X and XI of the convention, dealing respectively with assistance and economic and technological development. Some delegations continue to approach these matters from a rather narrow angle and see them as another North-South issue. In fact, insinuations have been voiced that these articles are being used to establish an "aid programme" under the convention. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The idea behind these two articles is closely linked to the objective of universal adherence to the convention and the strengthening of its viability. It is our belief that if States were assured that, by becoming parties to the convention, they would be able to rely on effective assistance from other States parties in the event of an attack or a threat of an attack, the incentives for adhering to the convention would be substantially increased. Conversely, a State will not become a party to the convention or, having become one, might withdraw from it unless it can count on guaranteed assurances of assistance from States parties in meeting a demonstrated threat to its security. Consequently, a provision which assures mandatory assistance to a State party subjected to an objectively verified attack or a threat of attack would go a long way in encouraging universal adherence to the convention, especially adherence by non-chemical-weapons States such as my own.

We have been participating in the consultations undertaken by Ambassador García Moritán, and we hope that we will be able to arrive at a text for article X which will adequately provide for the concerns that I have just enumerated.

The undertaking that we are seeking under article XI for the promotion of international scientific and technological co-operation is not new. Similar clauses exist in two other multilateral disarmament agreements, namely the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention. The case for such a provision is all the greater in view of the generally recognized interrelationship between disarmament and development, and the increased confidence that compliance with the convention would generate.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

My delegation's views regarding the bilateral Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the qualified destruction and non-production of chemical weapons have been adequately expressed in the plenary statement made on behalf of the Group of 21 on 24 July 1990. Nevertheless, I wish to reiterate today that efforts to introduce concepts in the convention which would result in undermining its universal and non-discriminatory character and scope would be counter-productive.

In concluding, I would like to express our hope that all delegations will capitalize on the existing international consensus on the need for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. We must resist the temptation of a less-than-comprehensive ban, or of interim or discriminatory measures which can only jeopardize the existing consensus and wash away the serious work done so far. Also, an inordinate delay or too laboured a rate of progress towards a comprehensive ban could lead to an erosion of world-wide interest in the subject. Thus, the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention is not only desirable, but would also provide a significant boost to the Conference on Disarmament and reinvigorate the multilateral disarmament process.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Pakistan, His Excellency Ambassador Kamal, for the statement he has just made and for his kind words and encouragement to the Chair. I am sure that delegations will have taken good note of the ideas he put forward concerning the negotiations on chemical weapons.

I have no more speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? That is not the case.

The secretariat has circulated today the timetable for the meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. This timetable was drawn up in consultation with the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and can be amended if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): There are no further matters to be discussed.

Before concluding, I would like to remind you that an informal meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will be held under the chairmanship of Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso immediately after this meeting.

I note with pleasure that this time the Conference has used to the full the time allotted for a plenary meeting. I am therefore now going to adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 7 August, at 10 a.m. Thank you for your participation. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.